Hard Minerals on the Deep Ocean Floor: Implications for American Law and Policy by Pietrowski, Robert F., Jr.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 19 | Issue 1 Article 5
Hard Minerals on the Deep Ocean Floor:
Implications for American Law and Policy
Robert F. Pietrowski Jr.
Copyright c 1977 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Robert F. Pietrowski Jr., Hard Minerals on the Deep Ocean Floor: Implications for American Law and
Policy, 19 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 43 (1977), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol19/iss1/5
HARD MINERALS ON THE DEEP OCEAN FLOOR:
IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN LAW AND POLICY
ROBERT F. PIETRoWSKI, JR. *
In May of 1977, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS)' reconvened for its sixth session.2 The atmos-
phere of that session was one of optimism that the impasse on deep-
sea mining issues could be overcome, thus facilitating the consensus-
building needed for continued negotiations toward a law of the sea
treaty. When the UNCLOS adjourned in July, however, the new
Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT), 3 successor to the
1975 4 and 1976 5 negotiating texts, was viewed widely as impairing
prospects for agreement on an international deep-sea mining regime.0
The head of the United States delegation to the UNCLOS recom-
mended to the President that the United States carefully review both
the substance and procedures of the Conference and consider whether
the nation's interests were best served by continued negotiations.7
This Article provides a review of American deep-sea mining policy
and maintains that, under existing international and domestic law,
American companies legally may mine the seabed's resources. More-
over, because this nation depends on foreign sources for essential
minerals that it otherwise might recover from the seabed, the
* B.S., Stanford University; J.D., University of Virginia. Partner, Law Offices
of Northcutt Ely, Washington, D. C. The author is an advisor to Ocean Mining
Associates (a partnership of subsidiaries of United States Steel Corp., The Sun
Co., and Union Miniere, S.A.) and Deepsea Ventures, Inc., on international and
administrative law matters relating to deep-sea mining.
1. The First UNCLOS met in 1958 and produced four conventions. See note 34
infra. The Second UNCLOS, convened by the General Assembly to define the
limit of the territorial sea, adjourned unsuccessfully in 1961. See G.A. Res. 1307,
13 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 54, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1953).
2. See notes 58-68 & accompanying text.
3. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10 (1977).
4. Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 8 (1975).
5. Revised Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1
(1976).
6. See, e.g., Testimony of Ambassador Richardson at 14 before the Sen. Comm.
on Energy and National Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 26, 1977) (un-
published transcript); N.Y. Times, July 21, 1977, at 2, col. 3; Wash. Post, July
17, 1977, at A18, col. 1.
7. Wash. Post, July 24, 1977, at A8, col. 1.
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United States should undertake unilateral action to encourage and
protect American deep-sea mining companies.
DEEP-SEA MINING IN PERSPECTIVE: AMERICAN HARD MINERAL SUPPLY
DEFICITS AND THE TREND TOWARD CARTELIZATION
The 1973 Arab oil embargo and the 1977 natural gas crisis dramati-
cally demonstrated the United States' vulnerability to curtailment of
petroleum supplies. Nonetheless, this nation currently imports forty-
two percent of its petroleum needs, an amount that has increased
from thirty-six percent in 1973.8 A situation of greater potential
danger exists with steel, the cornerstone of industrialization and na-
tional wealth in the United States. Steel cannot be manufactured with-
out manganese, and the United States has no known reserves of that
mineral. In addition, many important steel alloys require cobalt and
nickel, but the United States has no cobalt reserves and its nickel
reserves are equivalent only to two years' consumption. 9
The danger to the country's national security inherent in these
mineral deficits is obvious. Moreover, the instability of present sources
of these minerals compounds the risk. The United States imports
manganese primarily from Gabon, Brazil, Zaire, France, India, and
South Africa; nickel from Canada; cobalt from Zaire and Belgium;
and copper from Chile, Peru, and Canada. 10 Of these nations, only
Canada, Belgium, and -France qualify as "secure" sources. Even
Canada, however, -has become an unreliable supplier of oil and natural
gas, and the cobalt imported from Belgium actually is mined in Zaire.
More importantly, recent actions by the mineral exporting nations
evidence a determination to cartelize and to follow the successful ex-
ample of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
For instance, Article 5 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States,"' adopted by the United Nations General Assembly over the
objections of the United States, asserts both a positive right to form
producer cartels and a correlative duty not to resist the objectives of
such ventures. The Charter further demonstrates that only developing
countries may take advantage of the right and that the acquiescent
duty binds only developed nations. Other examples of the intent of
8. FEDERAL ENERGY ADMIN., ENERGY IN Focus: BASIC DATA 6 (1977).
9. BuREAu OF MINES, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, COMMODITY DATA SUM-
MARIES 42-43, 99, 112-13 (1976).
10. Id.
11. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974). Of the nine countries presently supplying more than 90 percent of the
American imports of manganese, nickel, cobalt, and copper, none joined with the
United States to vote against this resolution.
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the country's present natural resource suppliers to form cartels
abound. 12 Arguments that the member states of cartels will be incom-
patible and unable to interact cohesively simply are not persuasive;
similar arguments were made with respect to OPEC eight years ago.13
In recent years, the recovery of manganese, nickel, and cobalt from
manganese nodules found in seabed areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction has created an alternative to dependence on foreign
sources. The United States Department of the Interior estimates that
this country can be virtually self-sufficient in manganese, nickel,
cobalt, and copper within fifteen years if American companies pro-
12. Examples include the Group of 77 Manila Declaration and Program of
Action for Commodities, Trade Negotiations, Transfer of Resources and Tech-
nology, and Economic Cooperation, United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, TD/195 (4th Sess.) (1976), Manila Declaration and Programme,
U.N. Doc. 77/MM (111)/49 (1976); the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization Lima Declaration, ID/B/155/Add. 1 (1975); the Conference of
Developing Countries on Raw Materials, TD/B/c. i/L. 45 (1975); and the
Program of Action on the Establishment of a New Industrial Order, A/RES/3202
(SVI) (1974).
Existing mineral producer cartels include the Intergovernmental Committee on
Copper Exporting Countries, the Iron Ore Exporters Associations, the Inter-
national Bauxite Association, the International Tin Council, the International
Cadmium Institute, the International Association of Mercury Producers, the
International Phosphate Rock Export Association, and the Primary Tungsten
-Association. Other cartels are being formed.
13. For example, a recent study prepared for the National Bureau of Stand-
ards concluded:
Formation of an effective formal manganese cartel officially sus-
taining a much higher price for higher grade manganese ore does not
appear highly likely in the foreseeable future. . . . The two main
deterrents to formation of an effective and aggressive manganese
cartel are the incompatibility of those producers which must form the
core of such a cartel at its inception, and the long-run elasticity of
supply from noncartel producers. Noncartel producers would reap
the largest benefit from the output restrictions and consequent higher
prices of a cartel, since they can both increase their output and sell it
at a higher price. It seems likely that if a cartel attempted to main-
tain a price of more than two or three times the competitive level
enough manganese producers would follow the attractive option of
nonparticipation eventually to kill the cartel.
8 CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF PRODUCER COUNTRY SUPPLY
RESTRICTIONS 3-4 (1976).
In 1970, the same organization made a similar argument with respect to
OPEC's potential effectiveness as a cartel:
OPEC appears to be a loose cartel that will gradually disintegrate
in the future.... [I]t appears extremely unlikely that OPEC mem-
bers could cooperate effectively to achieve a price increase .... The
assumption that OPEC nations would mistakenly decide on a disad-
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ceed now with commercial recovery. 14 Although the requisite tech-
nology for seabed mining is available, the uncertainty of the ongoing
UNCLOS negotiations is a deterrent to further substantial investment
and development in ocean mining.
EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO DEEP-SEA
MINING OPERATIONS
Geologic and Geomorphic Preliminaries
Because geologic and geomorphic considerations form the basis for
much of the existing law of seabed jurisdiction, an understanding of
seabed geology and geomorphology is a prerequisite to any discussion
of the legal principles governing offshore mineral production. 15 The
earth's outermost solid layer, or "crust," consists of a thin, dense layer
of mafic rock in which thicker, less dense blocks of sialic material
float in isostatic equilibrium. As relief features of the earth's surface,
the sialic blocks form the continents, and the mafic layer forms the
abyssal ocean floors. These two types of crust, referred to as "con-
tiental" and "oceanic," possess significantly different physical prop-
erties. The junction of continental and oceanic crust usually occurs at
water depths of 4,000 meters or more. Hence, vast expanses of con-
tinental crust lie submerged bene; th the world's oceans.
A typical profile of submerged continental crust contains a broad,
flat "continental shelf" extending seaward from the shoreline and
sloping downward at about 0.1 degree. This area comprises the geo-
logic continental shelf, as distinguished from the legal continental
shelf, which, as explained below, embraces the entire submerged pro-
longation of the continental landmass. At a distance from shore of
about seventy-five kilometers and a depth of approximately 130
meters, the downward inclination of the typical continental landmass
increases to about four degrees. This steeper incline, which is known
as the "continental slope," begins at the frontal edge of the geologic
continental shelf, and together these two areas constitute the "con-
tinental terrace." At a depth of about 4,000 meters, the continental
vantageous price increase, even if they could enforce such an in-
crease, also seems to be unlikely.
CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, THE OIL IMPORT QUOTA 95-96 (1970).
14. Deep Seabed Mining: Hearings on H.R. 1270, H.R. 6017, & H.R.
11879 before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 81 (1975-76).
15. The information in this section is derived from Hedberg, Continental
Margins from Viewpoint of the Petroleum Geologists, 54 AM. ASS'N OF PETROLEUM
GEOLOGISTS BULL. 3 (1970).
[Vol. 19:43
OCEAN MINERALS
slope meets the deep ocean floor, but an accumulation of sedimentary
debris known as the "continental rise" often obscures this transition
from continental crust to oceanic crust. The term "continental mar-
gin" embraces the geologic shelf and slope; the landward portion
of the rise (that part of the rise overlying the foot of the continental
slope) also is often included in the continental margin.
This general description of a typical continental shelf is subject to
many exceptions. For example, some coastal states, such as Chile and
Peru, have practically no continental shelf: their landmasses drop
abruptly to the deep ocean floor within a few kilometers of the shore-
line. In parts of the Soviet Union, conversely, the shelf extends sea-
ward for hundreds of kilometers. Moreover, although the downward
inclination of the continental slope is usually about four degrees, it
may be as much as thirty degrees, and the width of the slope may
range from twenty to more than 100 kilometers. Finally, where a con-
tinental rise exists, the junction of the rise and the slope may vary in
depth from 1,500 to 3,500 meters.
The Area of Coastal State Jurisdiction
Under existing law a coastal state exercises exclusive rights to ex-
plore and exploit the natural resources of certain seabed areas that
are adjacent to its coast and beyond its territorial sea.16 This concept
of exclusive seabed resource jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea is
known as the doctrine of the continental shelf. Although the area en-
compassed by these rights generally is referred to as the "continental
shelf," a state's exclusive seabed resource jurisdiction extends well
beyond the geologic shelf previously described. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to distinguish between the geologic and the legal continental
shelf.
Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
defines "continental shelf" for purposes of resource jurisdiction as
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of
200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural
resources of the said areas.17
The legislative history demonstrates clearly that the Article's defini-
tion of the continental shelf does not limit resource jurisdiction to
the geologic shelf. For example, the International Law Commission,
16. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 138-39 (5th ed.
1967).
17. [1958] 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, T.I.A.S. No. 5578.
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which drafted the language of Article 1,18 stated in its 1956 report to
the United Nations General Assembly:
While adopting, to a certain extent, the geographical test for
the "continental shelf" as the basis of the juridical definition
of the term, the Commission therefore in no way holds that
the existence of a continental shelf, in the geographical sense
as generally understood, is essential for the exercise of the
rights of the coastal State as defined in these articles ...
[E]xploitation of a submarine area at a depth exceeding 200
metres is not contrary to the present rules, merely because
the area is not a continental shelf in the geological sense. 19
The construction of Article 1 most consistent with its legislative
history and with state practice was articulated in a 1968 Joint Report
to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, which
took the position that a coastal state's exclusive seabed resource juris-
diction (its legal continental shelf) extends over the entire continental
margin.20 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) implicitly con-
firmed this interpretation in 1969 in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases,2' in which the ICJ held, inter alia, that a coastal state's resource
18. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 1, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 296, U.N. Doc. A/ON. 4/SER. A/1957.
19. 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9), at 41.
20. As stated in the Joint Report:
The Convention's definition of the seaward extent of the coastal
state's jurisdiction has been subjected to a number of interpretations.
Some argue that the factor of exploitability would carry the
coastal nation's exclusive mineral jurisdiction to mid-ocean. We
disagree. Others argue that it should be restricted to waters as
shallow as 200 meters or 12 miles from shore. We disagree with this,
too.
The better view, in our opinion, is that the "exploitability" factor
of the Convention is limited by the element of "adjacency." The
exclusive sovereign rights of the coastal nations to the exploration
and exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil
encompass "the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the
area of the territorial sea." According to this view, therefore, the
exclusive sovereign rights of the coastal nations with respect to the
seabed minerals now embrace the submerged land mass of the adja-
cent continent down to its junction with the deep ocean floor, irre-
spective of depth.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JOINT REPORT OF SECTIONS OF NATURAL RE-
SOURCES LAW, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIvE LAW, AND THE STANDING COM-
MITTEE ON PEACE AND LAW THROUGH UNITED NATIONS, reprinted in SPECIAL
SUBCOMM. ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, 91ST CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT TO THE
SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS 35, 37 (Comm. Print 1970),
(emphasis supplied) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL SUBCOMM. REPORT].
21. [1969] I.C.J. 3.
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jurisdiction embraced that part of the seabed constituting the "natural
prolongation" of its land territory.22
Although the particular dispute in the North Sea. Cases involved
seabed areas primarily located in less than 200 meters of water, the
court's opinion articulated general rules of continental shelf law
that are applicable to seabed areas regardless of depth.23 The ICJ
identified the "most fundamental" of these rules:
[T]he rights of the coastal state in respect of the area of the
continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of
its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and
ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as
an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural
resources. In short, there is here an inherent right. In order
to exercise it, no special legal process has to be gone through,
nor have any special legal acts to be performed. Its existence
can be declared (and many states have done this) but does
not need to be constituted. Furthermore, the right does not
depend on its being exercised. 24
The court considered the inherent right of a coastal state to exercise
sovereignty over the natural prolongation of its land territory to be
"enshrined" in, but quite independent of, the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf.25 It held that international law confers ipso
jure title to the continental shelf on coastal nations as merely an ex-
tension of the dominion that those states previously have established
over their land territory.26
The ICJ's opinion also makes clear that the doctrine of the con-
tinental shelf is a recent phenomenon, having its inception in the
Truman Proclamation of 1945.27 Similarly, the Report of the Special
22. Id. at 54.
23. See Jennings, The Limits of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction: Some Possible
Implications of the North Sea Case Judgment, 18 INT'L & Com. L.Q. 819 (1969).
24. [1969] I.C.J. at 22.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 31, 51.
27. Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 437 (1949). Regarding the Truman Procla-
mation, the ICJ stated:
Although [the Truman Proclamation of 1945] was not the first or
only one to have appeared, it has in the opinion of the Court a special
status. Previously, various theories as to the nature and extent of the
rights relative to or exercisable over the continental shelf had been-
advanced by jurists, publicists and technicians. The Truman Procla-
mation, however, soon came to be regarded as the starting point of the
positive law on the subject, and the chief doctrine it enunciated,
namely that of the coastal State as having an original, natural, and
19771
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Master in United States v. Maine 28 concluded that the doctrine was
not "initiated" until 1945.29 Thus, prior to 1945, a coastal state's ex-
clusive rights to seabed resources terminated at the seaward limit of
its territorial waters. Beyond that boundary, all seabed areas - the
exclusive (in short a vested) right to the continental shelf off its
shores, came to prevail over all others being now reflected in Article
2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
[1969] I.C.J. at 32-33.
28. 420 U.S. 515 (1973).
29. Report of the Special Master at 79-80, United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515
(1973). The Special Master noted:
Prior to the [Truman Proclamation], rights to the resources of the
seabed beyond territorial waters could be obtained only on the basis
of prescription or actual occupation and neither the United States nor
the defendant States had made any such claim.
The Truman Proclamation of 1945 for the first time claimed
for the United States jurisdiction and control over the natural
resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beyond
the three-mile limit of the territorial sea off the coasts of the United
States. The Proclamation initiated a new rule of international law in
this regard.
Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Reference re Ownership of Off-
shore Mineral Rights, 65 D.L.R.2d 353 (1967), also found that the principle of
the continental shelf was a "recent development." The court premised its holding
that Canada, and not British Columbia, had exclusive rights to explore, exploit,
and legislate with respect to the continental shelf on a finding that the legal
doctrine did not exist before the confederation of the Canadian provinces in
1871; therefore, British Columbia could not have acquired exclusive seabed
resource jurisdiction prior to the confederation. The Court stated:
International Law in relation to the continental shelf is a recent
development. Lord Asquith of Bishopstone said in the Abu Dhabi
Arbitration that in the year 1939 it did not exist as a legal doctrine.
It was foreshadowed by the agreement between Great Britain and
Venezuela and the Truman Proclamation of 1945.
Id. at 376 (citations omitted).
The Abu Dhabi Arbitration involved a concession contract, entered into in
1939, which granted exclusive petroleum rights to Petroleum Development (Tru-
cial Coast) Ltd. in "the whole of the lands which belong to the rule of the Ruler
of Abu Dhabi and its dependencies and all the islands and the sea waters which
belong to that area." Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. v. Sheik of
Abu Dhabi, 1 INTL' & COMP. L.W. 247, 253 (1952) (Lord Asquith, Arb.). In
holding that this concession granted no rights beyond Abu Dhabi's territorial
waters, Lord Asquith commented upon the continental shelf doctrine:
I should certainly in 1939 have read the expression "the sea waters
which belong to that area" not only as including, but as limited, to,
the territorial belt and its subsoil. At that time neither contracting
as a legal doctrine did not then exist.




continental shelf, the continental slope, the continental rise, and the
abyssal ocean floor - were legally identical. This fact is of critical im-
portance to the determination of the existing law applicable to the
abyssal ocean floor.
The Area Beyond National Jurisdiction
Customary Law: The Practice of States in Seabed Areas Beyond
National Jurisdiction
Although prior to the emergence of the doctrine of the continental
shelf during the middle part of this century a coastal state's sovereign
rights generally terminated at the seaward extent of its territorial
waters, numerous nations nevertheless acquired exclusive rights be-
yond the territorial sea to such seabed resources as pearl, sponge,
coral, oyster, and chank fisheries. 30 These rights had been exercised
from time immemorial by certain nations. Immemorial usage was un-
necessary to establish such rights, however, and states could obtain
exclusive rights to specific deposits of resources (as distinguished
from the overlying waters) through exploitation.31 As the Special
Master in United States v. Maine concluded: "claims to exclusive
rights to the resources of the seabed at least beyond the territorial
sea must be based on long enjoyment (prescription) or on actual ex-
ploitation (occupation)." 32 Thus, without reference to the doctrine
30. Prior to the mid-twentieth century, states that exercised exclusive rights
with respect to seabed resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction included
Algeria, Australia, Ceylon, Columbia, England, France, Ireland, Italy, Mexico,
Panama, the Persian Gulf States (Oman and the Trucial Shaikhdoms), the
Philippines, Scotland, Sicily, Tunisia, the United States, and Venezuela. See, e.g.,
I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 206n.1 (1966); C.
COLOMBOs, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 571 (1965); T. FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY
OF THE SEA 696-98 (1911); M. McDOUGAL, & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF
THE OCEANS 648 (1962); D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 571 (1965); E.
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 127 (J.
Chitty ed. 1839).
31. For example, in his testimony before the Special Master in United States
v. Maine, Philip C. Jessup, former judge on the ICJ, commented:
[Regarding] this concept of immemorial usage as an alleged source
of rights under international law . . . the European powers seemed
to acknowledge that East Asian native rulers had something recog-
nizable as sovereignty which they could transfer. Thus, perhaps the
Portuguese, Dutch and English acquired prescriptive rights in
Ceylon and India from the native authorities.
Testimony of Philip C. Jessup before the Special Master, at 104, United States
v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1973).
32. Id. at 69. Other writers support this conclusion. See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 628-29 (8th ed. 1955); Waldock, The Legal Basis of Claims
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of the continental shelf, and long before the emergence of that legal
principle in 1945, a coastal state unilaterally could acquire exclusive
rights in the seabed beyond its national jurisdiction by exploiting the
resources located in those areas. Moreover, although these claims
technically attached to the resource rather than to the seabed, a neces-
sary element of such rights was the authority to exclude others
from the pertinent area and perhaps from the overlying waters as
well, 33 which otherwise retained the status of high seas.
When the doctrine of the continental shelf began to emerge as a
positive rule of international law in 1945, the resources traditionally
harvested from seabed areas beyond the territorial sea became subject
to national jurisdiction under this new principle. The doctrine, how-
ever, only extended national jurisdiction; it did not alter the inter-
national law applicable to state actions in that region of the seabed
remaining beyond their jurisdiction, specifically the abyssal ocean
floor. Thus, present customary law, unless changed since 1945, permits
the unilateral exploitation and acquisition of valuable resources, such
as manganese nodules, that are located on the deep ocean floor.
Conventional Law Applicable to Seabed Areas Beyond National
Jurisdiction
No convention, either bilateral or multilateral, has yet dealt ex-
pressly with natural resources in seabed areas beyond the present
limit of national jurisdiction. The 1958 Convention on the High Seas,34
to the Continental Shelf, 36 GROTIUS SOCIETY 115, 118 (1951). See also O'Connell,
Sedentary Fisheries and the Australian Continental Shelf, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 185,
188-90 (1955).
33. S. SWARTZTRAUBER, THE THREE-MILE LIMIT OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA 95-97
(1972).
34. [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312; 450 U.N.T.S. 82; T.I.A.S. No. 5200. The Convention
on the High Seas was drafted by the International Law Commission, established
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1947 to codify both existing and
emerging international law. Between 1949 and 1956 the Commission prepared and
revised numerous articles on the law of the sea, including a general regime for the
high seas. The Commission submittea its final report to the General Assembly in
1956, Report of the International Law Commission to the Genral Assembly, 11
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B.
INT'L CoMM'N 253, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1956/Add. 1. In 1958, the first
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea met in Geneva to consider
the Commission's draft articles and produced four conventions: the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1608, 516
U.N.T.S. 205, T.I.A.S. No. 5639; the Convention on the Continental Shelf, [1964]
15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, T.I.A.S. No. 5578; the Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, [1966] 17 U.S.T.
138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285, T.I.A.S. No. 5969; and the Convention on the High Seas.
[Vol. 19:43
OCEAN MINERALS
however, presumably applies to such resources and, by implication,
has codified the customary law permitting a state's acquisition of ex-
clusive rights to seabed resources in areas beyond its jurisdiction.
Article 2 of the Convention provides:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may
validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions
laid down by these articles and by the other rules of interna-
tional law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-
coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the gen-
eral principles of international law, shall be exercised by all
States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States
in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.35
Although Article 2 does not mention expressly a right to exploit the
seabed beneath the high seas, it clearly states that the four other free-
doms listed are not exclusive. Moreover, the legislative history of
Article 2, which derives its substance primarily from the 1955 draft
article prepared by the International Law Commission, 6 demon-
strates that the drafters considered exploitation of the subsoil beyond
national jurisdiction to be a freedom acknowledged by the general
principles of international law.37 Modified slightly, the draft article
appears in the Commission's 1956 report as Article 27.3s In its com-
mentary to Article 27, the Commission explains why exploitation of
the ocean floor was not codified specifically as a freedom of the high
seas:
The Commission has not made specific mention of the free-
dom to explore or exploit the subsoil of the high seas. It con-
sidered -that apart from the case of the exploitation or ex-
Fifty-five nations, including the United States, have ratified or acceded to the
Convention on the High Seas, and therefore are bound in their relations with
each other. Moreover, to the extent that they embody the customary law of the
high seas, the terms of the Convention are binding on all other nations.
35. 13 U.S.T., at 2314 (emphasis supplied).
36. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 10
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 1, U.N. Doc. A/2934 (1955), reprinted in [1955]
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 21, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1955 /Add.1.
37. 10 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9), at 3.
38. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 7, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 278, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1956/Add. 1.
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ploration of the soil or subsoil of a continental shelf exploita-
tion has not yet assumed sufficient practical importance to
justify special regulation.39
This report demonstrates that Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on
the High Seas permits the unilateral recovery of manganese nodules
from the abyssal ocean floor.40 Moreover, in codifying existing cus-
tomary law, Article 2 embraces the legal principle authorizing a
state's acquisition of exclusive rights to those exploitable seabed
mineral resources in areas beyond its national jurisdiction.
PROPOSED CHANGES OF EXISTING LAW: THE DETERRENT
TO DEEP-SEA MINING
The Common Heritage of Mankind Concept
On August 17, 1967, United Nations Ambassador Arvid Pardo of
Malta submitted a note verbale to the Secretary General requesting
that the General Assembly include in its agenda an item entitled
"Declaration and treaty concerning the reservation exclusively for
peaceful purposes of the seabed and of the ocean floor, underlying the
seas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, and the use of their
39. U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9), at 24.
40. This view has been asserted on numerous occasions by the United States
Department of State. For example, in 1970, John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser,
stated:
In the event that [United States] nationals should desire to engage
in commercial exploitation prior to the establishment of an interna-
tionally agreed regime, we would seek to assure that their activities
are conducted in accordance with relevant principles of international
law, including the freedom of the seas, and that the integrity of their
investment receives due protection in any subsequent international
agreement.
Hearings before the Special Subcomm. on the Outer Continental Shelf of the
Sen. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 210
(1969-70). And, in 1973, Charles N. Brower, Acting Legal Adviser, reiterated the
Department's position that "under international law or the High Seas Convention
... anyone who has the capacity to engage in mining of the deep seabed [may do
so] subject to the proper exercise of high seas rights of other countries involved."
Deep Seabed Hard Minerals: Hearings on H.R. 9, H.R. 7782, and H.R. 12238
before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 50 (1973-74). Again, in 1974, John
Norton Moore, Chairman of the National Security Council Interagency Task
Force on the Law of the Sea, stated: "The Executive Branch continues to hold
the view that deep seabed mineral exploitation constitutes a reasonable use of
the high seas and is presently permitted under international law." Mineral Re-
sources of the Deep Seabed: Hearings on S. 1134 before the Subcomm. on Min-
erals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
pt. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 994 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1134].
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resources in the interests of mankind." 41 The note verbale included a
memorandum declaring the mineral wealth of the deep seabed to be
the "common heritage of mankind," a concept that Pardo reiterated
when he later addressed the General Assembly on the matter of a new
legal regime for the abyssal ocean floor. According to one com-
mentator, "[t] he General Assembly was electrified by [Pardo's] elab-
orate, scholarly assertion of riches on the seabed to be readily har-
vested with immediate profit." 42 Although Pardo's assertions were
exaggerated, his assessment of the wealth to be obtained from the
ocean floor infused the common heritage concept with immediate and
substantial momentum.
Many developing countries that produce minerals for consumption
by industrialized nations were alarmed by Pardo's speech; they per-
ceived the deep seabed as an alternative source for certain minerals
and a threat to their export earnings. These states, however, con-
sidered Pardo's proposed regime a means to control the threat. In
contrast, other developing countries supported Pardo's suggestion as
a device through which they might share in the enormous profits that ,
according to Pardo, could be reaped from exploitation of the oceans'
subsoil.
The 1967 General Assembly subsequently established an Ad Hoc
Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Deep-Seabed. 43 The fol-
lowing session created a standing committee-the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits
of National Jurisdiction-to study the "legal principles and norms
which would promote international co-operation in the exploration
and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof,
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." a Then, on December 15,
1969, the General Assembly approved the "Moratorium Resolution,"
which called for a cessation of all exploitation in seabed areas beyond
national jurisdiction pending the establishment of a new international
regime to govern such activities.4 5
One year later, the General Assembly passed the "Declaration of
Principles," which provided the following guidelines to govern activi-
ties in seabed areas:
41. U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967).
42. E. WENK, THE POLITICS OF THE OCEAN 260 (1972).
43. G.A. Res. 2340, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 14, U.N. Doc. A/6716
(1967).
44. G.A. Res. 2467A, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 15, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1968).
45. G.A. Res. 2574D, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 11, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969). The resolution was approved by a vote of 62 to 28, with 28 abstentions.
The United States and other industrialized nations opposed its passage.
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1. The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof,
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the area), as well as the resources of the area,
are the common heritage of mankind.
2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any
means by States or persons, natural or juridical, and no
State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights
over any part thereof.
3. No State or person, natural or juridical, shall claim,
exercise or acquire rights with respect to the area or its
resources incompatible with the international regime to be
established and the principles of this Declaration.
4. All activities regarding the exploration and exploitation
of the resources of the area and other related activities shall
be governed by the international regime to be established. 46
To assist in the formulation of an international regime the General
Assembly also called for the convening of a Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea.4 7
The 1970 United States Draft Treaty
On August 3, 1970, the Department of State, over the objections of
the ranking members of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 48 presented a document entitled "Draft United Nations Con-
vention on the International Seabed Area" (Draft Treaty)4 9 at a
meeting of the United Nations Seabed Committee in Geneva. The
Draft Treaty proposed replacing the doctrine of the continental shelf
(as it applies beyond the 200 meter isobath) and the freedom of the
high seas doctrine (as it applies to the abyssal ocean floor) with a
new legal regime,50 vesting control over the seabed and its resources
46. G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doe. A/8028
(1970). The Declaration of Principles was adopted by a vote of 108 to 0, with 14
abstentions; the United States supported the resolution.
47. G.A. Res. 2750c, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 26, U.N. Doe. A/8028
(1970).
48. See SPECIAL SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 20, at 25.
49. U.N. Doe. A/AC. 138/25 (1970).
50. Article 1 of the 1970 United States Draft Treaty provided in part: "1. The
International Seabed Area shall be the common heritage of all mankind. 2. The
International Seabed Area shall comprise all areas of the seabed and subsoil of
the high seas seaward of the 200 meter isobath adjacent to the coast of continents
and islands." Article 2 further provided:
1. No State may claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights
over any part of the International Seabed Area or its resources.
Each Contracting Party agrees not to recognize any such claim or
exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights.
2. No State has, nor may it acquire, any right, title, or interest in
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in an International Seabed Resource Authority.51
In return for their renunciation of sovereign rights to the con-
tinental margin beyond the 200 meter isobath, the Draft Treaty
offered coastal states a "trusteeship" in this area.5 2 As trustee, the
coastal state could license exploration and exploitation operations in
the areas in which it formerly had exercised exclusive continental
shelf jurisdiction.53 Each nation would retain only part of the revenues
generated through its licensing activities, however; the remainder
would belong to the International Seabed Resource Authority.54 With
respect to activities on the abyssal ocean floor, the Draft Treaty pro-
vided that exploration and exploitation could be conducted only pursu-
ant to licenses issued by the International Seabed Resource Au-
thority.55 Although the Authority also would be funded in part by
revenues produced by these activities,56 members of the Senate
Interior and Insular Affairs Committee recognized that the leasing
activities of the immense bureaucracy proposed by the Draft Treaty
could not generate sufficient revenues to fund the organization.5 7
The SNT, the RSNT, and the ICNT
Not surprisingly, the Draft Treaty's proposal regarding the con-
tinental margin received little discernible endorsement by the other
nations represented at the UNCLOS, nearly eighty percent of whom
were coastal states that were unwilling to surrender their sovereign
rights to that area. The proposal for the creation of a powerful Inter-
national Seabed Resource Authority as a means to control access to the
ocean's mineral wealth on the seabed beyond the continental margin,
however, was embraced by the developing countries. As a result,
refinement of this concept has been an integral part of the subsequent
work of the UNCLOS.
Following a procedural session in 1973, the first substantive session
of the UNCLOS convened in Caracas in June, 1974. The Conference
the International Seabed Area or its resources except as provided
in this Convention.
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/25, arts. 1-2.
51. Id. art. 5.
52. Id. art. 13.
53. Id.
54. Id. art. 14.
55. Id. art. 13.
56. Id. art. 14.
57. Letter from Sens. Henry Jackson, Gordon Allott, Lee Metcalf, and Henry
Bellmon of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs to Secretary of
State William Rogers (July 21, 1970).
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distributed its work among three committees: Committee I was to
draft proposals for the deep seabed; Committee II was to prepare
draft articles relating to the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
continental shelf, the high seas, and the settlement of disputes; and
Committee III was to prepare draft articles on the marine environ-
ment, scientific research, and the transfer of technology. 58
At the conclusion of the third session of the UNCLOS in May, 1975,
the chairmen of the three committees released the "Single Negotiating
Texts" (SNT).59 Committee I's SNT consisted largely of a revision of
the 1970 United States Draft Treaty. It retained the concept of the
International Seabed Authority, composed of an Assembly, a Secre-
tariat, three Commissions, and a Tribunal, ° which would be vested
with absolute control over deep-sea miningY1 The SNT also provided
for revenue sharing, 2 and by virtue of its voting provision placed con-
trol over the Authority in the hands of the third world nations.63 Sup-
plementing the Draft Treaty, however, the SNT also established an
"Enterprise" to mine the deep seabed on behalf of the Authority 13 and
authorized the transfer of technology from industrialized nations to
third world countries.6 5
In 1976, the chairmen of the three committees and the President of
the UNCLOS prepared a "Revised Single Negotiating Text"
(RSNT) 6 to serve as a basis for continued negotiations. 7 At the com-
pletion of the sixth session of the UNCLOS in July, 1977, the Presi-
dent of the Conference released yet another revised text, the "Informal
Composite Negotiating Text" (ICNT).s68 Similar to its predecessors,
58. Johnston, Geneva Update, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. INTERESTS AND
ALTERNATIVES 177, 180, 186 (R. Amacher & R. Sweeney eds. 1975).
59. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SNT].
60. Id. art. 24.
61. Id. art. 21.
62. Id. art. 23, 3.
63. Id. art. 25, 5. This provides that "[e]ach member of the Assembly shall
have one vote."
64. Id. art. 35.
65. Id. art. 11.
66. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 8/Rev. (1976) [hereinafter cited as RSNT].
67. Id. at 1.
68. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ICNT]. The
ICNT was the result of a major revision of several compromise articles drafted
by Jens Evensen of Norway. Although Ambassador Richardson had stated that
substantial differences remained between the United States' position and the
"Evensen text," the Carter Administration was prepared to accept much of
Evensen's work. Nevertheless, after the compromise articles were passed to the
Committee I chairman, Paul Bamela Engo of Cameroon, and the Conference had
adjourned, the resulting ICNT replaced much of the Evensen text. See McCloskey
& Losch, Congress and the Law of the Sea Conference, 63 A.B.A.J. 1479 (1977).
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the ICNT did not purport to articulate a consensus on the subjects
covered; it was to serve only as a basis for further negotiations. 69
The possibility that the ICNT will become law, however, has ad-
versely affected American companies. Not only has the ICNT deterred
some companies from entering the ocean mining business; in addition,
pending a final UNCLOS treaty, those corporations conducting prep-
aratory operations are prejudiced severely in their efforts to obtain
outside financing. Moreover, the economic threat posed by the iCNT
impedes project managers from adequately justifying to their boards
of directors the additional investment of corporate funds in ocean
mining research and development. Initially, these problems derive
from the UNCLOS' failure to protect deep-sea mining investments
made before the ratification of any treaty, thereby subjecting those
business ventures to the full authority of the proposed regime.
7 0 Of
greater significance, the ICNT effectively would prevent the United
States and other major mineral importing nations from ever achiev-
ing self-sufficiency with respect to minerals in the deep seabed.
Structure of Inter'national Sea-Bed Authority
The ICNT would establish an International Sea-Bed Authority (Au-
thority) to administer the resources in the deep seabed.7'1 The struc-
ture of the Authority would afford broad regulatory power over deep-
sea mining to the developing countries, who would control its actions.
For example, the Authority's proposed legislative body, the Assembly,
consists of all parties to the treaty, each of whom is entitled to one
vote.7 2 Possessing greater authority than the United Nations' General
Assembly,7 3 the Authority's Assembly would promulgate binding sub-
stantive rules upon approval by a two-thirds majority of the members
present and voting.74 As evidenced by their recent tendency to vote as
a block in the General Assembly, the developing countries, would be
able to amass the required percentage of votes to control the legislative
actions of the Authority.
See also Statement of Ambassador Richardson before the Sen. Comm. on Energy
and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 26, 1977) (unpublished
transcript).
69. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Add. 1 (1977).
70. The ICNT not only lacks a "grandfather clause": it expressly declares
that no claims except those acquired in accordance with the treaty shall be
recognized. ICNT, supra note 68, art. 137, 7f 3.
71. Id. art. 154, 7f 1; id. art. 155, 7f 1.
72. Id. art. 157, 111 , 5.
73. See note 115 supra & accompanying text.
74. ICNT, supra note 68, art. 157, 6.
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The prejudicial attitude toward developed nations also inheres in
the ICNT's provisions establishing the Council, the Authority's execu-
tive branch. The Council will consist of thirty-six members elected
by the Assembly from five categories of interests.7 5 Moreover, neither
the United States nor any other nation will possess a permanent mem-
bership or a veto power over the Council's activities. Although de-
cisions by the Authority's Council on substantive matters will require
a three-fourths majority of the members present and voting,76 the
Council's membership formula does not guarantee that the noncom-
munist, industrialized states will control a sufficient number of votes
to defeat prejudicial actions sponsored by developing nations. Con-
versely, favorable action will be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce.
Contractual Arrangements with the Authority
Requiring that all deep-sea ocean mining be conducted on behalf of
the Authority,7 7 the ICNT would extinguish the right to mine the
ocean floor that presently exists under customary law and that was in-
corporated in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. To acquire rights
75. The Council will be comprised of:
(a) four members from among countries which have made the
greatest contributions to the exploration for, and the exploitation of,
the resources of the Area, as demonstrated by substantial invest-
ments or advanced technology in relation to resources of the Area,
including at least one State from the Eastern (Socialist) European
region.
(b) four members from among countries which are major importers
of the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, including
at least one State from the Eastern (Socialist) European region.
(c) four members from among countries which on the basis of
production in areas under their jurisdiction are major exporters of
the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, including at
least two developing countries.
(d) six members from among developing countries, representing
special interests. The special interests to be represented shall include
those of States with large populations, States which are land-locked
or geographically disadvantaged, States which are major importers
of the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, and least
developed countries.
(e) eighteen members elected according to the principle of ensuring
an equitable geographical distribution of seats in the Council as a
whole, provided that each geographical region shall have at least one
member elected under this subparagraph. For this purpose the geo-
graphical regions shall be Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe (Socialist),
Latin America and Western Europe and others.
Id. art. 159, f 1.
76. Id. art. 159, 7.
77. Id. art. 151, 1 2.
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to minerals located in seabed areas beyond its national jurisdiction
a state must comply with the provisions of the proposed treaty,78
which promote the creation of "joint venture" relationships between
contractors and the Authority. Although the President of the
UNCLOS has asserted that the ICNT will not "automatically impose
joint venture arrangements," 79 the proposal provides the Authority
with discretion to require this type of business association as a condi-
tion of awarding a contract.80 Moreover, in its rules, regulations, and
procedures promulgated to govern the financial terms of mining con-
tracts and in its negotiation of such contracts, the Authority must pro-
vide incentives for potential miners to undertake joint arrangements
with the Enterprise, the entity that will mine the seabed on behalf of
the Authority,8 ' and developing countries.8 2 Further, if the Authority
receives competing applications for a particular area, it must give
reasonable priority to the parties who are prepared to enter into joint
arrangements with the Enterprise. 3 These requirements are con-
sistent with the ICNT's objective of facilitating the rapid creation of a
viable Enterprise, 4 which will make available to developing countries
the technical expertise they presently lack.
Powers of the International Sea-Bed Authority
The ICNT would subject "all stages of operations" to the Author-
ity's control.8 5 Neither the RSNT, which initially included this pro-
vision," nor the ICNT defines this phrase. The Introductory Note to
the RSNT prepared by the Committee I chairman, however, stated:
As to the associated activities relating to exploration and
exploitation, attention is drawn to paragraph 5 of annex I.
This paragraph clearly states that normally a contract covers
all stages of operations, although a Contractor may apply for
a specific stage or stages. By implication, such stages as
feasibility study, construction of facilities, processing, trans-
portation and marketing are clearly not excluded. Thus, the
78. Id. art. 137, q 3.
79. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Add. 1, at 6 (1977).
80. ICNT, supra note 68, Annex II, 7 5 (i). For a discussion of the distinctions
between joint ventures, product sharing agreements, and service contracts see
Ely & Pietrowski, Changing Concepts in the World's Mineral and Petroleum
Development Laws, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REv. 9, 24-34.
81. ICNT, supra note 68, art. 169.
82. Id. Annex II, U 7 (a) (iv).
83. Id. U 5 (g).
84. ICNT, Explanatory Memorandum by the President, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/WP. 10/Add. 1, at 6 (1977).
85. ICNT, supra note 68, Annex II, 77 3 (b), 3 (c) (ii).
86. RSNT, supra note 66, Annex I, 77 5, 6.
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Authority shall decide what stages of operations are to be in-
cluded in a contract.8 7
If the Chairman's interpretation is correct, the powers granted to the
Authority by the ICNT are all-encompassing and extend to such mat-
ters as price control and processing plant location. Moreover, the
ICNT provisions directing the Authority's use of its power implement
a policy that unmistakably promotes the interests of the developing
countries by authorizing discrimination in their favor and restraints
on the production and marketing of seabed minerals. The results of
this policy are detrimental to the economic interests of the United
States.
Power to Deny Access to the Seabed
The provisions of the ICNT provide the Authority with discretion
to deny any state the right to mine the deep seabed. The Authority
must negotiate with an applicant only after determining 88 that the
resulting contract would ensure "the protection of developing coun-
tries from any adverse effects on their economies or on their earnings
resulting from a reduction in the price of an affected mineral, or in
the volume of that mineral exported, to the extent that such reductions
are caused by activities in the Area." 89 Because any production from
the ocean floor, in theory, would cause a reduction in the mineral ex-
port earnings of landbased producers, the Authority would possess
ample authority for denying any particular contract it chooses. Un-
doubtedly, the proposed regime would exercise its rights of nonnego-
tiation to further the interests of its majority constituents, the de-
veloping nations.
Required Technology Transfers and Compensatory
Payments
The Authority could require industrialized states and their nationals
to make direct transfers of technology to the Enterprise as a condi-
tion of acquiring rights to mine the deep seabed. 90 The ICNT also
specifies that the United States and other industrialized nations shall
87. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1/Part I, at 5 (1976).
88. ICNT, supra note 68, Annex II, fI 5 (c).
89. Id. art. 150, I 1 (g).
90. See, e.g., id. art. 151, f[ 2(ii); id. Annex II, ff 4(c) (ii), 5(d) (iv). The
only requirement for these transfers is that terms be "fair and reasonable," id.,
a phrase the third-world-dominated Authority will have discretion to construe. In
addition to the obligation of contracting parties to transfer mining technology,
the ICNT creates a general responsibility for all of its members to cooperate in
equitably distributing all pertinent scientific knowledge among themselves and
the Enterprise. See id. art. 144.
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compensate developing countries for their reductions in mineral ex-
port earnings resulting from deep-sea miningY1 Although the ICNT
does not expressly identify the source of the funds for this compensa-
tory system, the payments apparently will qualify as "[e] xpenses...
incurred by the Authority in carrying out the functions entrusted to
it under.., the Convention." 92 These expenses will be paid from both
the General Fund, which consists of the Authority's receipts from all
mining activities,93 and contributions by members of the Authority as
assessed by the Assembly.9 Because the industrialized nations will
generate the receipts arising from mining activities and will be
assessed for any required contributions, those countries will bear the
burden of replacing the losses of the mineral-exporting nations. In
effect, the compensation system penalizes countries such as the United
States for engaging in deep-sea mining activities and attempting to
achieve a degree of self-sufficiency with respect to certain minerals.
Power to Establish Production Controls, Quotas, and
Cartels
To maintain world mineral prices, the ICNT permits the Authority
to employ several different techniques that control the level of deep-
sea mining activities. The most direct restraint requires the Authority
to limit the production of manganese nodules: for the first seven
years of a period of indeterminate length, production cannot exceed
the "projected cumulative growth segment of the world nickel de-
mand"; thereafter the Authority must restrict the permissible nodule
yield to sixty percent of this figure. 95 The ICNT contains a mathemati-
cal formula for calculating the cumulative growth segment.9 6 Pres-
ently, however, the extent to which this provision might impede nodule
production has not been determined, and the President of the Con-
ference has recognized that "the quantitative aspects of the specific
measures to protect developing countries from adverse effects require
further negotiations." 97
91. Id. art. 150, I 1(g) (D).
92. Id. art. 172, 1.
93. Id. art. 170, 2.
94. Id. art. 172, 2.
95. Id. art. 150, ir (1) (g) (B) (i). At the conclusion of the first seven years of
the interim period, production may not exceed 60 percent of the "cumulative
growth segment of the world nickel demand." Id. Moreover, with respect to the
production of minerals from sources other than nodules, the Authority may regu-
late production through any method it deems appropriate. Id. art. 150, 1
(1) (g) (C).
96. See id. art. 150, 1 (1) (g) (B) (iii)-(iv).
97. ICNT, Explanatory Memorandum by the President, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/WP. 10/Add. 1, at 6-7 (1977).
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Contemplating another method of production restraint, the ICNT
foresees the future inclusion of a quota provision that would limit the
number of ocean mining operations in which any nation may engage.9 8
Given the Authority's virtually unlimited discretion to deny mining
contract applications, 99 however, a quota limitation appears to be
superfluous.
The ICNT also authorizes the formation of cartels to manage the
marketing of resources produced from the ocean floor.100 To protect
the interests of developing states, the proposed treaty expressly per-
mits the Authority to participate in cartel arrangements.' 01 Moreover,
the scope of the Authority's participation in a cartel encompasses all
mineral production from the seabed, including any production by
United States companies. 10 2
These three restraints on deep-sea mining all are designed to protect
third world countries from the potentially adverse economic effects
accompanying a grant to the developed nations of unrestricted access
to the ocean floor.10 3 Through its provisions limiting mineral recovery
and authorizing cartels, the ICNT would perpetuate the United States'
dependence on developing nations for its supplies of manganese,
nickel, and cobalt.
The Banking System
The ICNT's "banking system" removes one-half of the ocean floor
from the recovery opportunities of industrialized countries. The pro-
posed treaty requires that all successful applicants for mining rights
submit two potential sites of equal estimated commercial value to the
Authority, which will designate the area of its choice for future ex-
ploitation by the Enterprise or developing countries.10 4 Significantly
98. ICNT, supra note 68, Annex II, 5(1). See also ICNT, Explanatory
Memorandum by the President, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Add. 1, at 9
(1977).
99. See text accompanying notes 88-89 supra.
100. ICNT, supra note 68, art. 150, f 1(g) (A).
101. Id.
102. Id. The relevant text provides: "The participation by the Authority ...
shall be in respect of the production in the Area [seabed] . . . ." In contrast, the
RSNT authorized the Authority only to participate in cartels "in respect of its
production in the Area." RSNT, supra note 66, Part I, art. 9, 4 (i).
103. ICNT, supra note 68, art. 150, (1) (g).
104. Id. Annex II, 5 (j) (i). This provision provides:
The proposed contract area shall be sufficiently large and of suffi-
cient value to allow the Authority to determine that one half of it
shall be reserved solely for the conduct of activities by the Au-
thority through the Enterprise or in association with developing
countries. Upon such determination by the Authority the Con-
[Vol. 19:43
OCEAN MINERALS
increasing the exploration costs of applicants, the banking system
will require them to spend millions of dollars and years of work to
discover and map mine sites that they can never use. Moreover, to
demonstrate that both sites are equal in value, an applicant must
design mining equipment tailored to the topography and other physi-
cal characteristics of each area, conduct the research necessary to dis-
cover the most efficient refining process for particular ores, and de-
vise the plans for the necessary processing plants. Because the Au-
thority could not make an intelligent choice between the two tendered
sites without a similar expenditure of money and time, the applicant
would lose not only half of his investment in prospecting and research
activities but also the time required for the Authority's evaluation.
In contrast, the Enterprise, the applicant's competitor, would receive
the benefits of this expenditure of money and time as a windfall.
Express Power to Discriminate
In addition to the foregoing burdens placed by the ICNT upon
the United States and other industrialized nations, the proposed treaty
expressly permits the Authority to favor developing countries in its
actions. Although the proposed regime cautions the Authority to avoid
discrimination, 10 5 it defines that term to exclude any special con-
sideration that is given to the developing countries.10 6 Thus, in resolv-
ing conflicts between industrialized and third world nations, regard-
less of the merits, the Authority has discretion to attach the amount of
additional favoritism that it deems advisable 0 7 to the position of the
developing states. Because this result benefits those countries presently
controlling most of the world's supplies of manganese, nickel, cobalt,
and copper,10 8 the discrimination provision would strengthen further
tractor shall indicate the co-ordinates dividing the area into two
halves of equal estimated commercial value and the Authority shall
designate the half which is to be reserved. The Contractor may,
alternatively, submit two non-contiguous areas of equal estimated
commercial value, of which the Authority shall designate one as
the reserved area. The designation by the Authority of one half of
the area, or of one of two non-contiguous areas, as the case may be,
in accordance with the provisions of this subparagraph, shall be
made as soon as the Authority has been able to examine the relevant
data as may be necessary to decide that both parts are equal in
estimated commercial value.
105. Id. art. 150, 2(a).
106. Id. art. 150, 2(b).
107. The ICNT permits application of this special consideration with no ap-
parent limitation.
108. These countries include: Brazil (manganese), Chile (copper), Cuba
(nickel), Gabon (manganese), India (manganese), Morocco (cobalt), New
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the third world's already impressive control of many critical mineral
resources.
Lack of Competent Judicial Review
The proposed treaty provides exclusive jurisdiction to resolve dis-
putes between member states or their nationals and the Authority
to the Sea-bed Disputes Chamber. 10 9 Contravening fundamental prin-
ciples of United States administrative law, however, the ICNT ex-
pressly withholds from the Chamber jurisdiction to nullify actions by
the Council or Assembly that are either ultra vires or an abuse of dis-
cretion. 110 In effect, the ICNT's judicial review provisions permit the
Authority to promulgate rules, regulations, and procedures that are
contrary to the provisions of the treaty.
Lack of Right of Withdrawal
Because the Authority, in effect, may alter the terms of the treaty
after its adoption, an express right of withdrawal from the proposed
regime should be an essential requirement of the developed nations.
Although withdrawal from a treaty which provides therefor always is
permissible if effected in compliance with the agreement's relevant
provisions,"' the ICNT contains no such provisions. Therefore, a valid
withdrawal from the future treaty must comply with the terms of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provide:
Caledonia (nickel and cobalt), Peru (copper), the Philippines (copper), Zaire
(cobalt and copper), and Zambia (cobalt and copper).
109. ICNT, supra note 68, art. 187. The sovereign immunity provisions in the
ICNT render the Chamber's jurisdiction exclusive. Id. arts. 177-81.
110. In defining the scope of judicial review by the Sea-bed Disputes Chamber
the ICNT provides:
In exercising its jurisdiction . . . the Sea-bed Disputes Chamber
of the Law of the Sea Tribunal shall not pronounce itself on the
question whether any rules, regulations or procedures adopted by
the Assembly or by the Council are in conformity with the pro-
visions of the present Convention. Its jurisdiction with regard to
such rules, regulations and procedures shall be confined to their
application to individual cases. The Sea-bed Disputes Chamber
shall have no jurisdiction with regard to the exercise by the
Assembly or by the Council or any of its organs of their discretion-
ary powers under this Part of the present Convention; in no case
shall it substitute its discretion for that of the Authority.
Id. art. 191.
111. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 54(a), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 679, 699 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]; Harvard Research in International




A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termina-
tion and which does not provide for denunciation or with-
drawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless:
(a) it is established that the parties intended to admit
the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal or
(b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied
by the nature of the treaty.1 12
The United States, however, clearly could not establish that the
parties to the treaty intended to permit withdrawal, absent a provision
therefor. Moreover, because a right of withdrawal may be implied
only in treaties such as alliances, commercial or trading agreements,
and modi vivendi,"3 such an inferred power would not exist in the
regime created by the ICNT. Finally, even if the Authority exercised
its rulemaking power to place a much greater burden upon industri-
alized nations than originally anticipated by the treaty, the United
States could not invoke the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus and claim
that a fundamental change of circumstances permitted it to withdraw
from the ICNT's proposed international agreement. By ratifying the
treaty, it would have consented implicitly to these additional hard-
ships. Therefore, the doctrine, which is available only in situations
involving unforeseen developments, would not be applicable.1 4
The Effect of These Proposed Ch nges on Interitional Law
To date, neither the activities of the United Nations General Assem-
bly nor the various sessions of UNCLOS negotiations have effected a
change in international law, which presently permits a state to engage
unilaterally in deep-sea mining. Because the General Assembly has no
authority to enact rules of international law,1 5 neither the Mora-
torium Resolution nor the Declaration of Principles is binding on
United Nations member states or their nationals. Specifically, the ICJ
has recognized that, through its resolutions, the General Assembly
merely recommends that its members form various treaty relation-
ships." ,6
112. Vienna Convention, supra note 111, art. 56.
113. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 331 (H. Waldock ed. 1963); G. Fitz-
maurice, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/107, at 72
(1957).
114. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 111, defines the limited
application of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine.
115. A proposal granting the General Assembly such legislative authority was
rejected at the San Francisco Conference of 1945. 13 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 754 (1945).
116. Advisory Opinion on Voting Procedure, [1955] I.C.J. 67, 115. See also W.
BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 48-49 (3d ed. 1971); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-15 (2d ed. 1973); D. O'CONNELL, INTERNA-
19771
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Although the Moratorium Resolution and the Declaration of Prin-
ciples have not implemented substantive rules of law, they nevertheless
might be cited with the work of the UNCLOS as evidence of a change
in customary international law. Regarding this contention, the ICJ has
held that any state relying on a rule of customary law must prove both
the existence of the rule and its binding effect on an adversary na-
tion.117 For several reasons, however, a state probably could establish
neither that a new customary law with respect to deep-sea mining had
developed nor that the United States was obligated to follow any re-
cently-formulated legal restrictions.
Two recent decisions by international tribunals suggest that no new
rule of law has resulted from the UNCLOS. In 1974, the ICJ held in
the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases I"' that Iceland's unilateral claim of a
fifty mile fishing zone violated international law as codified in Article
2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. 19 In reaching its con-
clusion, the court viewed the proposals and documents prepared in
anticipation of a new law of the sea treaty merely as the opinions of
individual nations, rather than as evidence of existing law.' 2° In 1977
a court of arbitration reiterated this view, in a different context,1 2
determining that the apparent consensus within the UNCLOS regard-
ing an exclusive economic zone had not rendered the 1950 Convention
on the Continental Shelf obsolete. 22 These decisions reject the argu-
ment that international law has been modified by the concept of an
exclusive economic zone, an idea receiving substantial support both
within and without the UNCLOS negotiations. Their rationale should
apply equally in repudiating any suggestion that the UNCLOS activi-
ties in the highly controversial area of deep-sea mining have limited
the right to mine the seabed, which presently is authorized by custo-
mary law and the 1958 Convention on the High Seas.
Even if the UNCLOS negotiations had created a change in inter-
national law applicable to ocean mining, the United States would not
be bound thereby. From its initial opposition to the Moratorium Reso-
lution in 1969,123 the United States has maintained that the General
TIONAL LAW 26-28 (2d ed. 1970); MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 160-61
(M. Sorensen ed. 1968).
117. The Asylum Case, [1950] I.C.J. 266, 276-77.
118. [1974] I.C.J. 3, 175.
119. Id. at 29, 198. For a discussion concerning Article 2 of the 1958 Conven-
tion on the High Seas see notes 35-40 supra & accompanying text.
120. [1974] I.C.J. at 23, 192.
121. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (France v. Great Britain) (June
30, 1977).
122. Id. at 64. For a discussion of the doctrine of the continental shelf see notes
16-29 supra & accompanying text.
123. See note 45 supra.
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Assembly's action was only recommendatory 124 and that its nationals
legally could engage in deep-sea mining activities. 25 Moreover, al-
though some nations have suggested that the Declaration of Princi-
ples, which refers to the as yet undefined "common heritage of man-
kind" concept and which the United States supported, 1 prohibits
unilateral exploitation of the seabed, the United States government
repeatedly has rejected this view. 27 Because the United States con-
sistently has repudiated attempts to alter existing international law,
it would not be bound by any restrictions on deep-sea mining that
might have evolved. 28
The United States has not adopted an isolated position as to the
legality of ocean mining. To the contrary, other industrialized na-
tions, both communist and noncommunist, are either actively engaged
or preparing to engage in deep-sea mining operations. 129 The conduct
of these countries provides further evidence that the UNCLOS nego-
tiations have not altered the existing right under international law to
mine the seabed. 130
124. See, e.g., 30 U.N. GAOR 91, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 2444 (1975) (statement of
United States representative to the General Assembly) ; Letter of Jan. 16, 1970,
from John R. Stevenson, Legal Advisor, Department of State, to Sen. Lee Met-
calf, reprinted in SPECIAL SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 20, at 210.
125. See note 40 supra.
126. See note 46 supra.
127. See Hearings on S. 1184, supra note 40, at 994.
128. See, e.g., Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116, 131; J.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 52 (H. Waldock ed. 1963); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCI-
PLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-11 (2d ed. 1973)'; 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 66 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1970);
MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 136 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968); G. TUNKIN,
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (1974).
129. Entities presently engaged in the preliminary stages of deep-sea mining
include companies from the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Japan,
United Kingdom, Belgium, and Australia and according to press reports, state
agencies or enterprises in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, Hungary, and Poland. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR THE
USE OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES 37 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as OCEAN
MANGANESE NODULES].
130. The particular states involved, see note 129 supra, in deep-sea mining
ventures are significant, as suggested by the statement of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht,
formerly a Judge on the ICJ:
Moreover, assuming that we are confronted here with the creation
of new international law by custom, what matters is not so much
the number of states participating in its creation and the length
of the period within which that change takes place, as the relative
importance, in any particular sphere, of states inaugurating the
change. In a matter closely related to the principle of the freedom
of the seas the conduct of the two principal maritime Powers-
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Rationale for United States Participation in the UNCLOS Negatia-
tions to Date
Notwithstanding the deterioration of United States interests in the
UNCLOS negotiations, as reflected by the ICNT, the government has
continued its efforts to achieve a law of the sea treaty. With respect
to the work of UNCLOS Committee I, continued United States partici-
pation has been justified on the basis that, absent a treaty, a "gold
rush" on the ocean floor would occur. For example, former Secretary
of State Kissinger stated:
It is evident that there is no alternative to chaos but a new
global regime defining an agreed set of rules and pro-
cedures....
Eventually any one country's technical skills are bound
to be duplicated by others. A race would then begin, to carve
out deep sea domains for exploitation. This cannot but
escalate into economic warfare, endanger the freedom of
navigation, and ultimately lead to tests of strength and mili-
tary confrontations. 131
This argument, however, is not supported by the facts. Presently,
relatively few companies or state enterprises possess the requisite
technology and capital to engage in deep-sea mining. 32 Moreover,
manganese nodules exist throughout the world's oceans in great
abundance. One group has estimated that the Pacific Ocean contains
one and one-half trillion tons of nodules, increasing at the rate of ten
million tons every year.133 To date, approximately 500 potential com-
mercial recovery sites have been identified,134 but the Department of
the Interior has estimated that only fifteen to twenty mining opera-
tions will be in operation by the year 2000.135
such as Great Britain and the United States-is of special im-
portance. With regard to the continental shelf and submarine areas
generally these two states inaugurated the development and their
initiative was treated as authoritative almost as a matter of course
from the outset. This was so in particular having regard to the
traditional attachment of these states to the principle of the free-
dom of the seas and the customary limit of the territorial waters.
Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 376,
394 (1950). Judge Lauterpacht's statement was in reference to state activities on
the continental shelf, but its rationale applies with equal force to practices of
nations on the ocean floor.
131. U.S. Dep't of State, Press Release No. 162, at 4, 7 (April 10, 1976).
132. See note 129 supra.
133. OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES, supra note 129, at xiii.
134. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, MANGANESE NODULE RESOURCES AND MINE
SITE AVAILABILITY 11 (1976).
135. Id. at 9.
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Another justification for continued United States participation in
the UNCLOS negotiations is the protection of other important na-
tional interests. Particularly, government officials have expressed con-
cern that the emerging consensus on a twelve mile territorial sea 130
may close certain strategic straits to the right of submerged transit
by-placing them within the national jurisdictions of various states.
The results of the United States' efforts to protect this important
right in the ICNT, however, are uncertain: the relevant provisions
of the treaty do not provide expressly for the right of submerged
transit, and whether such a right is implied is questionable. 13 7 More-
over, regardless of whether the ICNT actually provides the right of
submerged transit, the government could achieve additional safe-
guards relating to straits if it is willing to consider seriously the alter-
natives to a comprehensive UNCLOS treaty.138 One of the United
States' most important options is its capability to establish a working
deep-sea mining program unilaterally, as presently authorized under
international law, and to use its leverage as a current producer to gain
important concessions from the developing countries in the future
UNCLOS negotiations.
IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED STATES
LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
An alternative to mining the deep seabed under a multilateral law of
the sea treaty is to proceed unilaterally under the existing freedom of
136. The ICNT expressly authorizes a 12 mile territorial sea. ICNT, supra
note 68, art. 3.
137. A Department of State representative has testified that the straits pro-
visions in the RSNT, which are substantively identical to the corresponding
articles in the ICNT, guarantee the right of submerged transit through those
straits within the extended territorial waters. See Testimony of G. Oxman before
the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-51
(June 15, 1976) (unpublished transcript). To reach this conclusion, however, the
government has not been able to obtain an express provision safeguarding this
important right; instead, the Department of State bases its opinion on a tenuous
construction of several interacting articles in the ICNT. See ICNT, supra note 68,
arts. 20, 38-39.
138. To protect the right of submerged transit through strategic straits, as an
option to the negotiation of a comprehensive UNCLOS treaty, the United States
could acquire the desired safeguards through the maintenance of bilateral
treaties with straits nations, such as Spain and Indonesia. In addition, this
country could retain its right of submerged transit in waters beyond the present
territorial sea limit if it refuses to ratify the UNCLOS treaty and to recognize
the twelve mile limit as a rule of customary law. A consistent denial of the
validity of an extended territorial sea would render that potential rule of
international law nonbinding on the United States. See text accompanying note
128 supra.
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the seas doctrine. For practical reasons, however, this approach re-
quires domestic legislation specifically authorizing American com-
panies to mine the deep seabed and providing them with certain in-
vestment protections against political risk. The costs of a deep-sea
mining operation, currently estimated at $300 million to $600 mil-
lion, 13 9 require outside project financing; without protective legisla-
tion, lending institutions will not provide the necessary funds. 140
Consistently opposing domestic legislation, which was first intro-
duced in 1971, on the ground that it would jeopardize American inter-
ests in the UNCLOS negotiations, the Department of State repehtedly
has persuaded the Congress to refrain from enacting unilateral deep-
sea mining laws.14' The rapidly deteriorating position of the United
States' interests in Committee I, however, probably will lead Congress
to enact domestic legislation in the near future, and the resulting laws
should contain provisions protecting both consumers and industry.
Congress can safeguard consumer interests by requiring that ore be
landed in, or processed in, the United States. 42 As long as the nodules
139. See Welling, Next Step in Ocean Mining-Large Scale Test, MINING
CONGRESS J., Dec. 1976, at 46, 50.
140. C. Thomas Houseman, Vice President of the Chase Manhattan Bank,
identified this problem in a recent statement:
Depending on their assessment of the specific situation lenders
may or may not decide to assume political risk. In my opinion,
lenders will not assume political risk in an under-sea mining ven-
ture if there are any uncertainties relating to the project company's
present or future legal right to exploit the reserve .... [I]n view
of the demonstrated desire of the international community to
establish control over such activity, the present absence of political
sponsorship and security of tenure constitutes, in my opinion, an
unacceptable business risk.
To sum up, then, it is my opinion that uncertainty as to the legal
and political status of an ocean mining venture will affect its
financial security, and that we are at a point in time that this
status should be unmistakably defined.
Statement of C. Houseman, at 3, 7-8 before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of
the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (March
17, 1977) (unpublished statement).
141. For examples of the State Department's assurances to Congress concern-
ing acceptable treaty dates and alternative legislative strategies see The Trail of
Broken Promises, reprinted in Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed: Hearing on
H.R. 11879 before the Subcomm. on Mines and Mining of the House Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 264-67 (1976).
142. See, e.g., H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 5(a) (5) (1977), which re-
quires "that minerals recovered under"authority of the license, to the extent of
in the United States, or on board United States vessels."
the proportionate interest therein of all United States entities, will be processed
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or metals (if processing takes place at sea) initially are brought
within the jurisdiction of this country, their future sale, whether in a
domestic or a foreign market, could be subjected to governmental
controls necessary to protect the interests of American consumers.
With respect to industry, domestic legislation should provide three
incentives for American companies to continue ocean mining pro-
grams. First, American industry must be given security of tenure, an
integral part of every modern mining law.143 A special need for site
specificity exists in the ocean mining industry because manganese
nodules vary greatly in physical characteristics depending on their
location, and proven technology limits the use of mining machines and
processing plants to specific mineral deposits. Consequently, miners
must be assured of continued access to a specific site before they will
incur expensive plant and machinery costs.
Second, investments made under the authority of, and in reliance on,
the legislation must be protected from impairment resulting from
the United States' ratification of a UNCLOS treaty. Such protection
has been made necessary by the ICNT's failure to shelter mining
operations initiated before the completion of a treaty. Congressional
acceptance of an international regime rendering useless statutorily-
approved investments should be regarded as a governmental taking
that requires just compensation. 4 4 Such provisions need safeguard
the miner only from political risks that are entirely within the control
of the United States government; all other potential dangers, includ-
ing disasters, market fluctuations and labor problems, would be ac-
cepted by the miner as normal commercial risks.
The third legislative incentive to the ocean mining industry should
provide insurance against those damages committed by parties against
whom the miner may exercise no legal remedy. The precedents for
federal insurance protection are numerous.145 Because a variety of
143. See generally N. ELY, SUMMARY OF MINING AND PETROLEUM LAWS OF THE
WORLD (2d ed. 1974).
144. United States courts have held that the due process clause of the Constitu-
tion applies to the actions of government officials without, as well as within, the
United States, see, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), and that the taking of
property by treaty or other international agreement gives rise to a right to just
compensation. Cf., e.g., Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457 (Ct. Cl. 1953) ;
Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340 (1886). See also L. HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 259-66 (1972).
145. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1709(h) (1970) (riot); 12 U.S.C. § 1744 (1970)
(Federal Housing Administration loans); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(c) (Supp. 1977)
(nuclear disaster indemnity); 46 U.S.C.A. § 1281 (Supp. 1977) (merchant
marine war risk); 12 U.S.C. § 1783 (1970) (credit union shares); 7 U.S.C. § 1501
(1970) (crops); 20 U.S.C. § 1132c-5 (Supp. II 1972) (academic facilities); 15
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ocean mining risks now may be insurable in the private sector, how-
ever,14 , governmental insurance, which could be funded from premi-
ums paid by all participating companies, need be furnished only to
the extent that the former coverage is unavailable. 147
Contrary to the assertions of the Department of State, 4 8 unilateral
legislation should provide American negotiators with greater bargain-
ing power and force third world nations to cease ignoring the eco-
nomic requirements of the United States and other industrialized
countries participating in the UNCLOS negotiations. Thus, domestic
legislation also should provide for compatability with any multilateral
regime to which the United States ultimately becomes a party.149 Such
a provision would give notice to the developing countries that the
United States is willing to consider only a reasonable treaty as a
means of implementing its oceans policy. 150
U.S.C. § 78aaa (1970) (securities investors); 42 U.S.C. § 1484 (1970) (farm
housing) ; 7 U.S.C. § 1929 (1970) (agricultural credit) ; 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (1970)
(flood); 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1970) (Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation);
12 U.S.C. § 1725 (1970) (savings and loan); 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1970) (unem-
ployment); 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1970) (Export-Import Bank political risk); 49
U.S.C. § 1531 (1970) (aviation war risk); 20 U.S.C. § 1071 (1970) (student
loans).
146. See Testimony of J. Dawson at 67, 70-71, 72 before the Subcomm. on
Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (April 26, 1977) (unpublished transcript).
147. One risk that is uninsurable in the private market is the threat of finan-
cial loss to a deep-sea mining enterprise resulting from the United States'
ratification of a UNCLOS treaty. Id. at 72. This fact underscores the need for a
realistic investment guarantee provision in the domestic legislation eventually
adopted.
148. See note 141 supra & accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., H.R. 3350, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 12 (1977), which provides:
At such time as an agreement providing for the establishment of
an international regime for the development of the hard mineral
resources of the deep seabed is ratified by and becomes binding upon
the United States, no additional licenses shall be issued pursuant to
this Act. To the extent that the provisions of the international
regime permit, the United States shall sponsor applications from
licensees under this Act for licenses under the international
regime and shall insure, to the maximum extent possible, that such
licensees receive the same rights, and have the same duties, under
the international regime, as are provided for under this Act.
150. Domestic deep-sea mining legislation also will contain a variety of other
provisions comparable to those found in other mining laws. The purpose of this
Article is not to offer specific statutory proposals but merely to identify those
areas that, because of the unique nature of a unilateral ocean-mining program,
will require careful congressional consideration.
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CONCLUSION
The responsibility for assuring American industries' access to the
minerals of the deep seabed at a reasonable cost rests with Congress. If
a treaty resembling the ICNT becomes binding on the United States
and its nationals, prior ocean mining investments will be rendered
substantially worthless. Without a reasonable congressional guarantee
that expenditures made in reliance on existing law will be protected by
the federal government from political impairment, companies cannot
be expected to invest further in deep-sea mining and risk the imple-
mentation of an international regime incorporating the provisions of
the ICNT. Absent this protection, the mineral resources of the ocean
floor will remain beyond the economic reach of American businesses
for many years to come; with it, the United States can become self-
sufficient in its needs for manganese, nickel, cobalt, and copper.
